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Abstract  
 
We investigate the drivers of excess interbank liquidity in Pakistan, using the Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag approach on weekly data for December 2005 to July 2011. We find that the 
financing of the government budget deficit by the central bank and non-banks leads to 
persistence in excess liquidity. Moreover, we identify a structural shift in the interbank market in 
June 2008. Before June 2008, low credit demand was driving the excess liquidity holdings by 
banks. After June 2008, banks’ precautionary investments in risk-free securities drive excess 
liquidity holdings. Monetary policy is less effective if banks hold excess liquidity for 
precautionary reasons.  
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Non-Technical Summary 
 
Government borrowing from the banking sector in Pakistan increased considerably 
between 2005 and 2011. At the same time, the interbank market of Pakistan has experienced an 
unprecedented accumulation of excess liquidity.  Empirical literature suggests that presence of 
excess interbank liquidity in developing economies often limits the ability of their central bank to 
effectively conduct monetary policy. This paper investigates the persistent presence of excess 
interbank liquidity, its causes, and its behavior in the interbank market of Pakistan. We use data 
from December 2005 to July 2011. The time and demand liabilities reported before December 
2005 is inconsistent with the currently available information on these variables.  
This paper statistically tests whether excess liquidity is a short-term phenomenon or a 
long-term phenomenon. In case of the former, effectiveness of the monetary policy is not 
undermined while in case of the latter it is weakened. The paper also analyzes the determinants 
of excess interbank liquidity in Pakistan, which are then separated into voluntary and involuntary 
liquidity components to study the behavior of excess liquidity in the interbank market.  
The findings of this paper suggest that the presence of excess liquidity in interbank 
market of Pakistan is persistent. Moreover, our empirical investigation identifies a number of 
variables contributing to excess interbank liquidity, such as deficit financing, foreign currency 
deposits, discount rate, volatility in the overnight rate, and industrial production. Also, our results 
point to the deficit financing by the central bank and non-banks for explaining persistence in 
interbank liquidity.  
The determinants of excess liquidity were then separated into voluntary and involuntary 
liquidity components. The key finding suggests that the interbank market in Pakistan has 
experienced a structural shift in June 2008. Before June 2008, low credit demand was driving 
(involuntary) excess liquidity holdings by banks. After June 2008, banks’ precautionary 
investments in risk free securities drive their (voluntary) liquidity holdings. 
This permanent shift of the banking sector towards holding government securities is not 
healthy for economy. Though our work does not deliberate on implication of increased risk free 
security holdings by banks on economic growth, we benefit from Mohanty et al. (2006). These 
authors note that developing countries with large fiscal deficit often increase local currency debt 
financing as a strategy to reduce government’s exposure to foreign currency risks. However, this 
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strategy could have adverse implication if there is a structural shift in banks’ behavior towards 
holding more risk free assets. These authors further argue that a large stock of government or 
central bank securities pushes up the risk premium on sovereign debt, and it could also lead to a 
sharp increase in the interest rate charged to private sector borrowers. Thus in the long run, the 
economy’s ability to generate higher savings as well as to borrow from external sources at lower 
cost may deteriorate, which also may limits its ability to invest in human capital. Consequently, 
the overall developmental goal of the economy may suffer.  
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1. Introduction 
  
Excess interbank liquidity is defined as the pool of reserves held by the commercial bank with 
the central bank, over and above the regulatory liquidity requirements.
1
 The findings of Nissanke 
and Aryeetey (1998) and Agénor and Aynaoui (2010) suggest that excess interbank liquidity in 
developing economies often limits the ability of the central bank to effectively conduct monetary 
policy.  
Several studies (including Agénor et al., 2004 and Saxegaard, 2006) investigate excess 
interbank liquidity by distinguishing between supply and demand components. The demand 
component reflects low demand for credit in the economy, while the supply component 
constitutes the part of excess liquidity that banks hold for precautionary reasons. Banks may be 
holding liquidity for precautionary reasons if the risk of default is likely to increase and this 
perceived default risk cannot be internalized by raising the risk premium on lending (Agénor et 
al., 2004). In addition, structural or cyclical factors may lead to precautionary liquidity 
accumulation. As will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.1, structural determinants include 
the presence of a large informal sector, inaccessibility of remote areas of the country, and a weak 
or inefficient payment system. Cyclical factors, such as fluctuations in foreign capital inflows, a 
change in inflationary expectations or government borrowing, may also cause banks to hold 
liquidity for precautionary reasons (Agénor and Aynaoui, 2010). 
Central banks can design monetary policy more effectively if the cause of excess 
liquidity is known. For example, if excess liquidity is largely due to low credit demand 
expansionary monetary policy may not be very effective. Any attempt by the central bank to 
stimulate aggregate demand by relaxing monetary policy will only add to excess liquidity. 
Likewise, if the central bank would tighten its policies in the presence of excess liquidity, a 
sudden improvement in credit demand may cause a rapid increase in credit thereby undermining 
the central bank’s policies.  
This study examines the interbank market of Pakistan as a case study. In response to the 
recent global financial crisis, the State Bank of Pakistan (henceforth SBP) eased its policies. As 
will be explained in more detail in Section 2.2, the regulatory liquidity requirements have been 
relaxed frequently since June 2008 while the pool of securities that are eligible as reserves has 
                                                 
1
 Mishkin (2012). 
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been widened. These measures led to an unprecedented liquidity accumulation in the interbank 
market of Pakistan. The presence of excess interbank liquidity may weaken the monetary 
transmission mechanism as acknowledged in the State Bank of Pakistan (2011). We investigate 
the nature and causes of excess liquidity in the interbank market of Pakistan. 
This study is innovative for two reasons. First, the study investigates the persistence of 
excess liquidity.
2
 To the best of our knowledge, persistence of excess interbank liquidity has not 
been evaluated before using high frequency data. Second, the study defines interbank liquidity 
by augmenting it with government securities that are eligible to meet liquidity requirements. 
Mohanty et al. (2006) argue that banks’ deposits at the central bank may be misleading as 
indicator of liquidity if the banks hold substantial amounts of government securities that can be 
sold easily to the central bank.  
Our findings suggest persistence of interbank excess liquidity. Our results also indicate 
that the financing of the government’s budget deficit by the central bank is one of the causes of 
this persistence in interbank liquidity. Moreover, we identify a structural shift in the interbank 
market in June 2008. Before June 2008, low credit demand was driving excess liquidity holdings 
by banks. After June 2008, banks’ precautionary investments in risk free securities drive their 
liquidity holdings.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the 
implications of excess liquidity for monetary policy and outlines monetary policy in Pakistan. 
Section 3 discusses previous studies, while Section 4 describes our methodology. Section 5 
describes the data used and Section 6 offers our main results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Excess liquidity and monetary policy in Pakistan 
 
Following Mohanty et al. (2006), we include government securities that are eligible in meeting 
regulatory liquidity requirements in calculating excess liquidity.
3
 Thus we define excess liquidity 
as the ratio of reserves deposited with the central bank by the banks, cash in their vault and 
eligible government securities, in excess of the statutory limit to the total time and demand 
                                                 
2
 Fuhrer (2009) defines ‘persistence’ as a tendency of an economic variable not to change, in the absence of 
economic forces that could have move it elsewhere. 
3
 Agénor et al. (2004), Ruffer and Stracca (2006), , Saxegaard (2006), and Gigineishvili (2011)use similar measures 
for excess liquidity but do not include short-term government securities.  
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liabilities of the banks.
4
 We include eligible securities as the banking sector in Pakistan holds a 
considerable amount of highly liquid short-term government securities, which banks can 
substitute for cash using the SBP’s discount window at their own discretion (Mohanty et al., 
2006).  
 
4.2.1 Excess liquidity and monetary policy 
 
The SBP actively uses all policy tools at its disposal to manage liquidity. These policy tools are 
direct tools, such as cash reserve requirements and statutory liquidity requirements, and indirect 
tools, such as the discount rate and open market operations.
5
  
 If the SBP raises reserve or liquidity requirements, excess interbank liquidity decreases 
immediately, which in turn causes the interbank lending rate to increase. Subsequently, the 
lending and the deposit rates respond. If the central bank raises the discount rate, risk-averse 
banks are likely to increase their liquidity holdings to mitigate liquidity risk. Likewise, open 
market operations of the central bank will affect interbank liquidity.  
Banks hold excess liquidity either due to low demand for credit (involuntary excess 
liquidity) or for precautionary reasons (voluntary excess liquidity). If firms’ demand for credit 
declines due to weak economic activity banks accumulate excess liquidity. Alternatively, banks 
may hold liquidity as a precaution if the risk of default on extended credit is expected to rise. 
Moreover, structural and/or cyclical factors may promote precautionary liquidity holdings by 
banks. Often structural impediments like a less developed financial sector or a large informal 
sector force banks to hold extra liquidity. For example, banks tend to have greater demand for 
liquidity due to the unreliability of the payment system. Also, the cost of processing information, 
evaluating projects, and monitoring borrowers is relatively high in these economies, which 
generally leads to accumulation of liquidity (Agénor and Aynaoui, 2010). Similarly, the presence 
of a large informal sector promotes cash transactions instead of transactions through bank 
instruments like checks or bills in order to avoid taxes. The banks are then forced to hold large 
liquid reserves to meet frequent large demands for cash.  
Cyclical factors refer to fluctuations in inflationary expectations, foreign capital inflows, 
                                                 
4
 The eligible assets include short-term market treasury bills, Pakistan Investment Bonds (PIBs) up to a certain 
maximum, and other government enterprise bonds. 
5
 The SBP also frequently uses ‘moral suasion’, i.e., the commercial banks’ executives are briefed on objectives of a 
specific policy move and the central bank’s expectation of the market response. 
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and government borrowing.
6
 Elaborately, a higher volatility in prices increases uncertainty about 
the value of the collateral pledged by the borrower. The banks may react to inflation risk by 
charging a higher premium to the borrower or by increased rationing of credit. Agénor and 
Aynaoui (2010) argue that both an increase in the risk premium and credit rationing may result in 
the involuntary accumulation of excess liquidity.  
Furthermore, in the past two decades, foreign capital inflows have contributed 
significantly to the accumulation of excess liquidity in developing economies (Ganley, 2004; and 
Agénor and Aynaoui, 2010). Irrespective of the presence of a pegged or a managed float (or a 
crawling peg) regime, capital inflows add to excess interbank liquidity. Under a pegged 
exchange rate regime, foreign capital inflows cause upward pressure on the nominal exchange 
rate which may lead to central bank foreign exchange interventions. If the central bank sterilizes 
these interventions by selling securities to the banks, excess liquidity holdings of the banks 
increases. The situation is not very different under a managed float regime, except that here the 
central bank always intervenes to maintain the exchange rate within the targeted range.  
Finally, government borrowing from the central bank may act as a catalyst regarding 
excess interbank liquidity accumulation. In developing economies, often the government 
borrows directly from the central bank. This borrowed money enters in the monetary system very 
quickly in the form of deposits at banks and hence becomes part of the money supply (see Table 
A1 in Appendix for an overview of Pakistan’s recent monetary developments)7. For this reason, 
the government borrowing from the central bank is generally known as monetization of the 
deficit.
8
 The increase in deposits leads to excess liquidity holding of the banks. Ganley (2004) 
notes that the monetization of the deficit is one of the main sources of excess liquidity in some 
developing countries.  
Persistent fiscal deficits may also increase the interest rate on the government debt. The 
higher return may attract the banks towards risk free government securities. Mohanty et al. 
                                                 
6
 See Agénor and Aynaoui (2010) for further details. 
7
 When government borrows from the central bank, the central bank’s assets increase in the form of government 
security. In exchange of those securities, the central bank increases government deposits held with the central bank. 
When government pays for goods and the services, the individual’s deposits at the banks increases at the expense of 
the government’s deposit at the central bank. Thus the central bank’s liability with the banks increases as a result of 
government asset held by the central bank. The increased deposit base increases money supply. Table A1 in 
appendix briefly presents the overview of this mechanism.  
8
 This monetization may have inflationary consequences (De Haan and Zelhorst, 1990; Fischer et al. 2002; and 
Catao and Terrones, 2005). 
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(2006) argue that inflationary expectations fuelled by government borrowing may further 
increase the interest rates. In such a high interest rate environment, the banking sector may 
structurally shift towards holding more risk-free assets, thereby crowding out private sector debt.  
 
2.2 Recent developments in monetary policy in Pakistan  
 
Two important features characterize the period under consideration in this study. First, the 
foreign currency deposits steadily increased over this period, specifically after May 24
th
 2008, 
when the exchange rate depreciated sharply (see the lower panel in Figure 1). Pak Rupee 
depreciated against US Dollar by almost 7- percent in May 2008 due to speculative attack. 
Resident foreign currency deposits
9
 are deposits denominated in foreign currency held by 
individuals or firms with local banks, independent of the nationality or residential status of the 
holder.
10
 As regulatory requirements limit the local banks’ access to the international market, 
banks often substitute the foreign currency for domestic currency to invest in the local money 
market.  
The SBP has a managed float strategy to mitigate exchange rate volatility and to alleviate 
perceived exchange rate risk. To stabilize the exchange rate, the SBP replaces the foreign 
exchange inflows with domestic currency, either through direct purchases, or through currency 
swaps.
11
 The interventions in the exchange rate market thus increase interbank liquidity. The 
banks prefer placing this liquidity in the form of short-term risk-free securities as financial 
markets in Pakistan lack financial depth. 
  
                                                 
9
 Residence Foreign Currency Deposits generally known as RFCD. 
10
 Vide F.E. Circular No. 25, 20
th
 June 1998, State Bank of Pakistan.  
11
 The substitution of foreign currency by domestic asset involves exchange rate risk. The SBP’s managed float 
strategy does not mitigate the exchange rate risk completely. To mitigate the exchange rate risk, banks use currency 
swaps with the central bank and also with peer banks.  
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On May 24
th
 2008, the SBP further tightened its policies using both direct and indirect 
tools. As a result, the effective reserve requirements reached 26.5 percent of time and demand 
liabilities of the banks, the highest the banking sector of Pakistan has witnessed over the last 
decade.
12
 The SBP relaxed this requirement at the start of the global financial crisis. In October 
2008, the requirements were brought down twice with 100 bps. However, the SBP continued its 
tight monetary policy stance using the discount rate (see Table 1 for details).  
 
Second, during this study period monetary policy was tightened as the discount rate 
mostly moved upward (see the panel in the middle of Figure 1). Table 1 details the various 
policy steps of the SBP. First, on 22
nd
 July 2006 all savings deposits were classified as demand 
liabilities. Other notable changes include the re-classification of special notice deposits and time 
                                                 
12
 The effective reserve requirements for any given week is the weighted average of the cash and liquidity reserve 
requirements based on their respective time and demand liabilities. 
Table 1. Chronology of Changes in Policy Instruments 
Date 
Cash reserve requirements   Liquidity requirements  
Discount 
rate 
Demand liabilities  Time liabilities  Demand 
liabilities 
Time 
liabilities Weakly 
average 
Daily 
minimum  
Weakly 
average 
Daily 
minimum   
31-Dec-05 5.0 4.0  5.0 4.0  15.0 15.0 9.0 
22-Jul-06 7.0 4.0  3.0 1.0  18.0 18.0  
29-Jul-06         9.5 
19-Jan-07 7.0 6.0  3.0 2.0     
1-Aug-07         10.0 
4-Aug-07 7.0 6.0  0.0 0.0  18.0 18.0  
2-Feb-08 8.0 7.0       10.5 
24-May-08 9.0 8.0     19.0 19.0 12.0 
30-Jul-08         13.0 
11-Oct-08 8.0 7.0        
18-Oct-08 6.0 5.0        
1-Nov-08 5.0 4.0        
13-Nov-08         15.0 
21-Apr-09         14.0 
15-Aug-09         13.0 
25-Nov-09         12.5 
2-Aug-10         13.0 
30-Sep-10         13.5 
30-Nov-10         14.0 
  
8 
 
deposits of less than 6 months from time liabilities to demand liabilities. The re-classification 
was extended to time deposits of up to 12-month maturity on 4
th
 August 2007. In tandem, reserve 
requirements were increased on demand liabilities but relaxed on time liabilities (see Table 1). 
These measures increased the effective reserve requirements to more than four percent of time 
and demand liabilities, i.e. PKR 12.7 billion (see the upper panel in Figure 1). As will be 
explained in more detail below, the SBP aimed to push the sticky deposit rate upward. The SBP 
also wanted to reduce the maturity mismatch between the assets and the liabilities of the banking 
sector and therefore time liabilities are exempted from cash reserve requirements since August 
4
th
 2007.
13
 
On October 18
th
 2008, the SBP increased the eligibility of long-term government bonds 
from 5- to 10- percent of the statutory liquidity requirements.
14
 The move increased the 
borrowing ability of banks from the SBP’s discount window by roughly PKR135 billion thereby 
increasing excess liquidity holdings of the banks substantially. As the literature shows that the 
long-term presence of excess liquidity weakens the monetary policy, it is therefore important to 
investigate if these policy moves by the SBP have created persistence (long-term presence) in 
excess liquidity present in the interbank market of Pakistan. Moreover, investigation leading to 
the causes of liquidity accumulation in the interbank market of Pakistan could be an important 
contribution in understanding the dynamics banks’ behavior in interbank market and 
effectiveness of monetary policy. 
 
3. Related studies  
 
The economic literature on interbank liquidity is mostly theoretical, striving to model the banks’ 
behavior and/or the central bank’s policy response when the interbank market suffers from 
adverse liquidity shocks, be it aggregate or idiosyncratic shocks. Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), 
Freixas and Holthausen (2005), Heider et al. (2010), and Allen et al. (2009) examine the banks’ 
behavior in case of aggregate shocks, while Bolton et al. (2009), Acharya et al. (2012), Diamond 
and Rajan (2009), and Freixas et al. (2011) focus on scenarios in which banks suffer from 
idiosyncratic shocks. However, only a few studies examine interbank liquidity in normal times. 
                                                 
13
 The State Bank of Pakistan (2006) identifies the following objectives of these changes in the reserve 
requirements: (i) draining excess liquidity from the inter-bank market, in order to put upward pressure on the money 
market rates; and (ii) encouraging banks to mobilize long-term deposits. 
14
 See Vide BSD Circular No. 24 of 2008, State Bank of Pakistan. 
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Wyplosz (2005) examines the accumulation of excess liquidity in the Eurozone before the crisis, 
arguing that this buildup was due to deficient borrowing resulting from weak growth prospects. 
Agénor et al. (2004) analyze the buildup of excess liquidity in the interbank market of Thailand 
during the East Asian crisis. Their results also suggest that the increased excess liquidity by 
banks reflected weak credit demand in the wake of the crisis. Likewise, based on a survey among 
central banks of developing and emerging economies, Mohanty et al. (2006) argue that the 
buildup of excess liquidity in the last decade was due to weak credit demand from the business 
sector. 
Surprisingly, there is little work formalizing the channels through which excess liquidity 
impacts the monetary transmission mechanism. Saxegaard (2006) examines excess liquidity in 
sub-Saharan Africa and its consequences for the effectiveness of monetary policy. He quantifies 
the impact of excess liquidity using impulse responses from threshold VAR models. The study 
suggests a weakening of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the presence of excess 
liquidity.  
More recently, Agénor and Aynaoui (2010) provide a theoretical framework for modeling 
excess liquidity in a general equilibrium setup. They argue that excess liquidity may hamper the 
ability of monetary policy makers to lower inflation. Their model shows that excess liquidity 
induces easing of collateral requirements on borrowers, which in turn may translate into a lower 
risk premium and lower lending rates, thus resulting in asymmetric bank pricing behavior. To the 
best of our knowledge, excess liquidity in the interbank market of Pakistan has not been studied 
earlier.  
 
4. Methodology 
 
We first use unit root tests to examine the data generating processes of the variables used in the 
analysis. If excess liquidity is stationary in levels, we see interbank liquidity accumulation as a 
short-term phenomenon not hampering monetary policy. If excess liquidity has a difference 
stationary data generating process, we see liquidity accumulation as a long-term phenomenon 
which may have serious repercussions for the effectiveness of monetary policy as discussed in 
Section 1. Next, we investigate the long- term determinants of excess interbank liquidity, 
distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary liquidity holdings.  
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4.1 Persistence of interbank liquidity 
 
In generalized form, an augmented unit root process can be described by  
t
k
p
ittt yyy   



1
1
110   
             (1)  
where ty is the series to be tested,  is the deterministic trend, 0 and 1 are parameters, while 
 and  are the coefficients of the unit root and the lagged dependent variable respectively, and 
t is the error term (for details, see Enders, 2004; Hamilton, 1994). Empirical studies frequently 
use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests. However, the 
performance of these tests deteriorates significantly in the presence of structural changes (Perron, 
1989). As policy variables, such as the discount rate and required reserves, are subject to policy 
shocks (see Figure 1), we therefore will want to use unit root tests also for structural breaks.  
The literature proposes a number of unit root tests incorporating structural breaks (e.g., 
Perron 1989, 1990; Zivot and Andrews, 1992; Perron and Vogelsang 1991, 1992; and Ng and 
Perron, 2001).
15
 Shresta and Chowdhury (2005) argue that the power of the Perron and 
Vogelsang (1992) test is superior in the presence of a structural break, while Enders (2004) 
argues that the Perron-Vogelsang test is more appropriate in case of an uncertain break date. 
Table 1 and Figure 1 suggest a number of policy shifts during the period under consideration in 
this study. If an economic series experiences more than one structural shift, Ben-David et al. 
(2003) argue that the power of the unit root test with one structural break reduces significantly. 
Figure 1 shows that the some variables may have suffered from more than one shift.  
We employ the unit root test with two breaks as suggested by Clemente et al. (1998), 
which is an extension of the Perron and Vogelsang (1992) test with one structural break.
16
 This 
class of unit root tests distinguishes two types of outliers: an additive outlier and an innovative 
outlier. The additive outlier test best suits to series exhibiting a sudden change in mean, while the 
innovative outlier test assumes that the change takes place gradually. As the power of these tests 
improves considerably if the break points are known a priori, often the tests employ grid search 
to locate the break points. For simplicity, assume that the breaks occur at an unknown date,
                                                 
15
 For empirical studies of unit root tests with structural breaks, we refer to Banerjee et al. (1992), Christiano 
(1992), De Haan and Zelhorst (1994), Perron (2005), Glyn et al. (2007), and Carrion-Silvestre et al. (2009).  
16
 If the test of Clemente et al. (1998) suggests both structural shifts are significant we keep this result. However, if 
this test finds only one significant structural shift we employ the Perron and Vogelsang (1992) test. 
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TTT bb  211  with T being the sample size. The additive outlier test follows a two-step 
procedure. First, the deterministic part of the series is filtered using  
tttt yDUDUy
~
2211   ,            (2) 
where break dummies 1mtDU  for bmTt  , and 0 otherwise, for m = 1, 2, and the remaining 
noise ty
~  is examined for a unit root  
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1  ,                     (3) 
The change in the break dummy 1)( itb mTD  if 1 bmTt  and zero otherwise, while k is the 
truncated lag parameter determined by a set of sequential F-tests. 
The innovative outlier model assumes that an economics shock to a trend function of a 
variable affects the subsequent observations. Starting from its initial position the shocks 
propagates to the subsequent observations through the memory of the system. The estimation 
strategy is based on;  
tit
k
i
ittbtbttt eyyTDTDDUDUy  

 
1
1221122110 )()(     .      (4) 
 ))(( 2211 tttt DUDUeLy   ,                       (5) 
In Equations (2) and (4), i measures the immediate impact of the changes in mean. The 
innovative outlier test can identify the long-run impact of changes by the design of its alternative 
hypothesis. Here, L is the lag operator 1 tt yLy . The first lag 1122111 )()1(   ttt eDUDU   
in Equation (5) picks up the long-run effect. Both models test the null hypothesis of a unit root, 
that is 1 . The limiting distribution of these test statistics does not follow the Dickey–Fuller 
distribution and Perron and Vogelsang (1992) and Clemente et al. (1998) provided the critical 
values respectively for one and two structural breaks. If 1 , the null hypothesis is rejected and 
series is stationary. Clemente et al. (1998) collapses to Perron and Vogelsang (1992) test when 
restriction m=1 i.e. only one break is imposed on the former.  
 
 
4.2 Long-term determinants of excess liquidity 
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To identify the long-term determinants of excess liquidity in Pakistan, we utilize the 
methodology proposed by Agénor et al. (2004), augmented by Saxegaard (2006). Equation (6) 
presents excess liquidity with its voluntary and involuntary determinants. 
tttt vXLXLELL 
2
3
1
21 )()()(       (6) 
where, )(Lj  are lag polynomials, tEL is the ratio of excess reserves to total deposits, 
1
tX  
and 
2
tX  
are vectors of variables that explain voluntary and involuntary excess liquidity holdings, 
respectively, and tv is an error term. Any structural break can be included as a trend component 
in the model.  
 The vector
1
tX  
includes variables such as required reserves, discount rate, output gap, 
volatility in the overnight rate, volatility in the government borrowing from the SBP, and foreign 
currency deposits. Any change in the policy tools (required reserves and the discount rate) has a 
direct impact on excess liquidity in the interbank market. The output gap captures demand for 
cash.
17
 The volatility of the overnight rate is an indicator of interbank liquidity risk. The more the 
overnight rate is volatile, the more the bank will be cautious in managing its liquidity holdings. 
Volatility in government borrowing from the SBP also increases volatility of the current deposits 
with the banks and hence banks may become more vigilant in managing their precautionary 
liquidity holdings. Foreign currency deposits are included to capture exchange rate risk. As 
discussed earlier in Section 2, the banks in Pakistan substitute foreign currency assets for 
domestic government securities. Typically, such substitution involves exchange rate risk. The 
managed float strategy practiced by the SBP reduces the volatility in the exchange rate and hence 
partially mitigates the exchange rate risk. However, foreign currency deposits are denominated in 
foreign exchange and any sudden speculative withdrawal of foreign currency deposit may expose 
banks to exchange rate risk.  
Agénor et al. (2004) propose to derive the determinants of involuntary excess liquidity
2
tX , as a residual from Equation (6), when this equation includes only voluntary liquidity 
                                                 
17
 Arguably, the output gap should be the part of the involuntary liquidity accumulation as it captures the fluctuation 
in credit demand. However, following Saxegaard (2006) we include it as a determinant of voluntary liquidity 
accumulation. Saxegaard (2006, p. 21) argues: “We also include the output gap Y (in voluntary liquidity) to proxy 
for demand for cash. In particular, in a cyclical downturn one would expect the demand for cash to fall and 
commercial banks to decrease their holdings of excess reserves.”. We will deliberate further on this issue in Section 
6.2. 
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accumulation factors, 
1
tX . This approach, however, inherently minimizes involuntary excess 
liquidity 2tX . To overcome this drawback, Saxegaard (2006) proposes augmenting the approach 
of Agénor et al. (2004) with variables that are important in the buildup of involuntary excess 
liquidity. Since involuntary accumulations are driven by a deficient private sector credit demand, 
Saxegaard (2006) proposes to include a large number of macroeconomic factors as explanatory 
variables for 2tX . Following Saxegaard (2006), we include credit to the private sector, credit to 
the government (by the SBP, commercial banks and the non-banking sector), Index of Industrial 
Production (IIP) indicating the level of economic activity, and the exchange rate as explanatory 
variables in 2tX .  
Private sector credit is negatively related to excess liquidity. Any increase in private 
sector credit decreases excess liquidity holdings of the banks. The impact of government 
borrowings from the SBP, the commercial banks, and the non-banks on excess liquidity may 
differ. Government borrowing from the central bank leads to the creation of new deposits. When 
the government borrows from the central bank, the central bank increases the government’s 
deposit with the central bank. As the government makes payments for the goods and services it 
has acquired, the increase of the deposit rapidly increases the monetary base. Table A1 in 
Appendix shows that impact of the government borrowing on assets and liabilities of the banking 
sector. Thus the government borrowing from the central bank increases the excess liquidity 
holding of the banks through increase in the banks’ deposits. Ganley (2004) suggests that 
borrowing from the central bank is the main source of excess interbank liquidity in many 
countries. We therefore expect that government borrowing from the SBP will have a positive 
effect on excess liquidity. Borrowing from non-banks involves a transfer of funds from the banks 
to the non-bank institutions and hence it should affect excess interbank liquidity negatively.  
When a government borrows from commercial banks, the excess reserves of the banks 
with the central bank are transferred to the government account. As the government makes 
payments for the goods and services it acquires, the borrowed amount gets transferred quickly 
from the government account to the accounts of individuals or private businesses thus 
replenishing the liquidity holdings of the banks. Therefore, government borrowing from the 
banks is not expected to have any impact on excess liquidity as the assets and liabilities of the 
banking sector remains unchanged (see Table A1 in Appendix).  
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An increase in the level of economic activity, as captured by the Index of Industrial 
Production, is likely to increase the money demand in the economy which in turn increases the 
liquidity holdings of banks. We expect a positive relation between increased industrial 
production and excess liquidity. Similarly, when the Pakistan Rupee depreciates the foreign 
currency liabilities of the banks will increase. Therefore, banks are likely to switch their excess 
liquidity with foreign currency assets. Hence, we expect exchange rate movements to have a 
negative effect on excess liquidity.  
Separation of the voluntary and involuntary components of liquidity in the framework of 
Equation (6) requires identification of the intercept and the lagged dependent variable. This can 
be explained as follows. Rewriting Equation (6) gives: 
tttpt
dsss
t vXLXLELcaaEL  
2
3
1
11 )()()(ˆ)]1([     (7)  
where cˆ the intercept and p is the number of lags associated with the dependent variable. In 
Equation (7), the intercept has a voluntary component 
sa  and an involuntary component )1( sa  
which are indistinguishable. Similarly, the voluntary 
s
1  and involuntary 
d
1  parts of the lagged 
dependent variable are also inseparable. As we are interested in the long-run relationship and the 
long-run coefficients estimation uses the lagged dependent variable ptEL   Therefore, separate 
values of 
s
1 and 
d
1  is not necessary. However, identification of the intercept is required. 
Ideally, we would like to have information on the banks’ precautionary reserves on a weekly 
basis. As this information is not available, we use the minimum average cash reserves held by 
the banks above statutory requirements, in any given week, as a proxy for the precautionary 
liquidity holdings intercept
sa . We assume that the minimum amount of cash reserves held by 
the banks is the ‘mean’ of precautionary liquidity holding. Since the intercepts refer to levels, 
they will not impact estimates of the variation in voluntary or involuntary components of 
liquidity.  
As will be discussed in Section 6, some explanatory variables are difference stationary. 
Therefore, we will use the Bound Testing Approach proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001) for 
identification and the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach for estimation of the 
long-run relationship between the levels of the variables.  
 Compared to other procedures for detecting long-run relationships, such as Johansen’s 
rank test, the Bound Testing procedure has two distinct advantages. First, it does not require 
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testing the data generating processes of the underlying series and remains applicable even if 
regressors are a mixture of I(0) and I(1) variables. Second, it allows a large number of 
explanatory variables, as in Equation (6), which involves in our application thirteen regressors 
and their lags. The Bound Testing procedure employs a generalized Dickey–Fuller type 
regression and tests the significance of the lagged level of the variables in a conditionally 
unrestricted error correction model (ECM)  
t
n
k
n
k
tk
j
tk
j
txtELt uELxxELEL   
 

0 1
1
'
1
'
1
'
110  ,                (8) 
where jtx indicates j
th
 regressor, 0 and 1  are trend parameters, 
'
k and 
'
k are short run 
regressor parameters, tu is the error term, and EL , and x  are long-run parameters, the joint 
significance of which is tested using an F-test. The asymptotic distribution of the F-statistic is 
non-standard. Pesaran et al. (2001) provide two sets of asymptotic critical values for the upper 
and lower bounds for the F-statistic. The upper bound assumes that all regressors are I(1), while 
the lower bound assumes all are I(0). The F-test has the null hypothesis that there exists no long-
run relationship between the variables, i.e. 0 xEL  . If the F-statistic falls outside the upper 
bound, the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship is rejected indicating that the regressors 
are forcing a long-run relationship on the dependent variable.
18
 However, if the F-statistic falls 
within the bounds information on the order of integration of the underlying variables is essential 
to draw conclusions.   
The long-run relationship.is estimated from the ARDL equation,     
tkt
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k
k
n
k
j
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j
k
m
j
t ELxEL   




101
 .          (9) 
Here tx is the set of regressors, k
j are coefficients for any jth regressor at lag k, k reflects the 
stickiness in the dependent variable at lag ‘k’. Starting with a maximum number of lags, a 
general to specific approach is used to adopt a parsimonious model with white noise residuals. 
We employ a battery of diagnostic tests to check the robustness of the specified model.
19
  
                                                 
18
 Bound tests assume only one cointegrating relationship exist where weakly exogenous dependent variable forces a 
long-run relationship on the dependent variable. This method of detecting a long-run relationship remains valid even 
in presence of more than one long-run relationship. Next paragraph further discusses this issue. 
19
 For example, we test for serial correlation with the Breusch-Godfrey test and/or Portmanteau (Q) test. The 
Breusch-Godfrey test is useful in testing low order autocorrelation, whereas the Portmanteau (Q) tests works better 
for higher order autocorrelation (Lütkepohl and Kratzig, 2004, p -129). Both tests take no serial correlation as the 
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Like other single equation cointegration procedure, ARDL also presumes only one long-
run relationship; from regressors to the dependent variable. When development in the 
explanatory variable drives the changes in the dependent variable in presence of only one 
cointegrating vector, then explanatory variables may be termed as weakly exogenous to the 
system (Kirchgässner and Wolters, 2007 p-207).
20
However, if the dependent variable also forces 
a long-run relationship on one or more of the regressors, then assumptions that there exists only 
one cointegrating vector and the regressors are weakly exogenous are violated. In that case, the 
coefficient estimates obtained from the ARDL model are not efficient.
21
  However, they remain 
asymptotically consistent and can be used for making inferences (Harris, 1995).  
We use the Bound Test for establishing the weak exogeneity of regressors. Each regressor 
is used as a dependent variable to test for the existence of a long-run relationship with excess 
liquidity. If the F-statistic does not reject the null hypothesis of no long run relationship between 
the variables, the regressor can be considered weakly exogenous for the relationship specified in 
Equation (9).  
The long-run relationship is obtained from the ARDL estimates of Equation (9). For this 
purpose, the lagged dependent variable is used as shown in Equation (10). Hence, lag dependent 
variable is not required to be identified with the voluntary or involuntary components, as 
discussed earlier.   




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
  .               (10) 
Using information on ‘excess cash reserves’ holdings ( sa ) and the long-run estimates 
using Equation (10), the ‘voluntary’ (ELs) and the ‘involuntary’ (ELd) component of excess 
                                                                                                                                                             
null hypothesis. Normality of the residuals is tested using the Shapiro-Wilk test with normally distributed residuals 
as the null hypothesis. For checking the stability of the specified model, CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests, proposed by 
Brown et al. (1975) are used. The CUSUM test uses cumulative sums of recursive residuals based on the first n 
observations, which are updated recursively and plotted against the break points. If the plot of the CUSUM statistics 
stays within the 5 percent significance level, the coefficient estimates are said to be stable. CUSUMSQ applies a 
similar procedure, but is based on the squared recursive residuals. 
20
 Also, Kirchgässner and Wolters (2007, p-225) defines weak exogeneity as; 
A variable is weakly exogenous with respect to the cointegration parameters if and only if no (other) cointegrating 
relation is included in the equation of this variable. (Text in parenthesis added for clarity). 
21
 Harris (1995) notes that;  
Assuming that there is only one cointegrating vector, when in fact there are more, leads to inefficiency in the sense 
that we can only obtain a linear combination of these vectors when estimating a single equation model.  
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liquidity can be calculated, as shown by Equation (11).    
1
2 )(ˆˆ t
ss
t XLcaEL                 (11) 
tt
sd
t vXLcaEL 
2
3 )(ˆˆ)1(  . 
 
5. Data  
 
We use weekly data from the last week of December 2005 to the first week of July 2011. The 
SBP reports net time and demand liabilities in a new format since the last week of December 
2005, excluding Islamic banks and foreign currency liabilities from net time and demand 
liabilities. Previously, Islamic banks and foreign currency liabilities were not clearly identified. 
Hence, excess liquidity calculated using recent information is not consistent with excess liquidity 
based on figures before December 2005. Unfortunately, net time and demand liabilities do not 
include foreign currency deposits held by banks. Foreign currency asset and liability holdings of 
the banks are accounted separately and are subjected to different prudential requirements. 
However, compared to the total demand and time liabilities the magnitude of foreign currency 
deposits is small.  
We employ weekly data as it helps in maintaining sufficient degrees of freedom which is 
important as our specification involves a large number of explanatory variables and their lags. 
Using weekly data has a serious drawback too. Some explanatory variables are reported on a 
monthly basis. Fortunately, the specification used in this study involves only two variables with a 
monthly frequency, namely the index of industrial production, and government borrowing from 
non-banks. We disaggregate them into weekly data using forward moving averages over 6-weeks 
as the series obtained using as this procedure yields least mean error.
22
 Table A2 in the appendix 
provides further details of the variables used in this study.  
For estimating the output gap, we employ the Hodrick-Prescott (HP)-filter to the index of 
industrial production since GDP is only available on a yearly basis.
23
 The output gap is measured 
as the gap between the HP trend and the actual level of output at any given time. Further details 
are provided in Office for Budget Responsibility (2011). The volatilities of the overnight rate and 
                                                 
22
 Forward moving average is based on, 


6
16
1
i
itt nn
, where nt indicates any specific week at time t. 
23
 We have used (λ=270,400) but following Ravn and Uhlig (2002)’s recommendation to use (λ= 45,697,600) gave 
similar de-trended series. See Figure A1 in Appendix for the comparison of the two series obtained using the above 
values of λ. 
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of government borrowing from the SBP are calculated as ratios of standard deviation to the 
average over a moving 13- week period. The effective reserve requirements for any given week 
is the weighted average of the cash and liquidity reserve requirements based on their respective 
time and demand liabilities.   
 
6. Results  
 
6.1 Unit root tests 
 
The results for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips and Perron (PP) unit root tests 
are reported in Table A3 (in the Appendix). Except for the output gap and the volatility of the 
government borrowing from the SBP, all variables appear difference stationary at the five 
percent level of significance. Figure 1 shows sharp shifts in the policy variables, which may have 
caused loss in power of PP or ADF unit root tests, as discussed in Section 1. Therefore, the 
difference stationary variables are subjected to the unit root test proposed by Clemente et al. 
(1998), which allows for two structural breaks. This test also helps in identifying whether there 
are one or two structural breaks. If the test of Clemente et al. (1998) suggests two significant 
structural shifts we retain the test results, but if this test suggests only one significant structural 
shift we employ the Perron and Vogelsang (1992) test with one structural break.   
The results for the unit root test with structural breaks are reported in Table 2. Except for 
excess liquidity and some GDP normalized macroeconomic variables (such as private credit, 
foreign currency deposits, government borrowing from banks and non-banks) all variables are 
level stationary with significant breaks. The identified break dates are in the vicinity of the 
various policy moves of the SBP as described in Table 1. For example, unit root test with 
discount rate shows that the series suffered a structural break on May 10 2008, while the SBP 
increased the discount rate by 150 bps on May 23
rd
 2008.
24
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Only those break dates should be taken into account for which the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected. In other 
words, even if AO and IO tests shows different no of breaks, the difference in the number of break dates is not 
important if only one test rejects the null hypothesis of unit root.  
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As the difference stationary behavior of excess liquidity is directly related to the 
effectiveness of monetary policy, it is investigated thoroughly. In a competitive market, banks 
are expected to respond to policy shocks by changing their liquidity holdings; they increase 
liquidity holdings when monetary policy is lax and decrease them when it is tight. The estimates 
reported in Table 2 shows that the null hypothesis of unit root excess liquidity cannot be rejected 
at 5- percent level of significance. It is possible that excess liquidity has more than two structural 
shifts. Though, the power of the test proposed by Clemente et al. (1998) in the presence of more 
than two structural shifts may be low, leading to non-rejection of the unit root null hypothesis 
even if this series is stationary. To be certain about the integrated behavior of excess liquidity, 
we utilized rigorous tests as proposed by Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) incorporating up to five 
Table 2. Results for Unit Root Tests with Structural Breaks 
 
Additive Outlier Test 
 
Innovative Outlier Test 
 
Test stats. 
No. of 
breaks Break dates Test stats. 
No. of 
breaks Break dates 
Excess liquidity -2.841 2 28-03-09, 08-05-10 
 
-2.585 2 19-01-08, 4-10-08 
Required reserves -4.187 2 17-05-08, 25-10-08 
 
-9.530* 2 10-05-08, 04-10-08 
Discount rate -1.842 2 12-07-08, 01-08-09 
 
-5.447* 1 10-05-08 
Private credit -3.068 2 24-11-07, 13-06-09 
 
-3.504 2 19-09-07, 14-03-09 
Foreign currency deposits -1.909 2 03-05-08, 02-01-10 
 
-3.329 2 12-01-08, 12-12-09 
Exchange rate -2.222 2 19-07-08, 08-08-09 
 
-6.292* 2 05-04-08, 14-06-08 
Government borrowing from:   
    Commercial banks  -1.428 2 24-03-07, 22-08-09 
 
-0.539 - 
     SBP -3.076 2 12-01-08, 14-06-08 
 
-4.579* 1 11-10-07 
    Non-banks -0.796 2 05-05-07, 06-03-10 
 
0.217 1 12-12-09 
*5% Critical Values 
2-breaks  -5.49 
   
-5.49 
  1-break -3.56 
   
-4.27 
  **10% Critical Values 
2-breaks  -5.24 
   
-5.24 
  1-break -3.22 
   
-3.86 
  Notes: Only difference stationary variables in ADF or PP test are subjected to unit root tests with structural breaks. 
No. of breaks shows the significant breaks at the five percent significance level, suggested by the unit root tests. 2 
breaks the statistics refer to the test proposed by Clemente et al. (1998), while 1 break indicates that the test 
statistics refer to the test proposed by Perron and Vogelsang (1992). The null hypothesis assumes that series has a 
unit root. Break dates are identified by the unit root tests. Break dates should be read as week ending on day-month 
-year (dd-mm-yy). 
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structural breaks. These authors have adopted a variety of tests, including a DF type test with 
structural breaks proposed by Harris et al. (2009) for designing unit root tests that can 
accommodate up to 5- structural breaks. The null hypothesis of a unit root of these tests cannot 
be rejected confirming integrated behavior of excess liquidity. For example, the calculated the 
DF test statistics (-4.32) provided by Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) is lower than that of its 5- 
percent critical value (-4.56).  
The unit root characterization of the data generating process of excess liquidity suggests 
that the variable has infinite memory and any shock to the series persists forever. This result 
confirms the long-term presence of excess liquidity in the interbank market of Pakistan which 
may be detrimental to the conduct of the monetary policy. The persistence of interbank liquidity 
may have resulted from policy surprises (as shown by Figure 1) during the period under 
consideration. Findings of Rubina and Shahzad (2011) suggest that monetary policy of the SBP 
is often inconsistent and non-transparent so that markets only slowly learn the true intentions of 
the monetary authorities. Westelius (2005) argues that such a learning process creates 
persistence. 
 
6.2 Analysis of long-run relationship 
 
As discussed in Section 2, we use the Bound Test Approach for testing the existence of a long-
run relationship as the specification involves variables that are I(0) and I(1). Although the unit 
root tests have identified structural shifts in most explanatory variables, we did include the shift 
dummies but they turned out to be insignificant. A maximum of five lags is imposed for all 
estimation purposes to obtain reasonable degrees of freedom as the model has a large number of 
regressors.  
 Table 3 shows the F-statistics for the joint significance of the error correction term of the 
Bound test.
25
 The F-statistic (3.45) for excess liquidity is greater than the five percent critical 
value indicating that the regressors are forcing a long-run relationship on excess liquidity. To 
determine whether the regressors are weakly exogenous, separate Bound tests have been 
conducted, using each regressor in Equation (6) as a dependent variable. The significant F-
                                                 
25
 Pesaran et al. (2001) have provided critical values only up to ten variables whereas our model includes 12 
explanatory variables. The table with critical values provided by Pesaran et al. (2001) shows that the critical value 
generally decreases with the increased number of regressors. Hence, our inference is probably not affected.    
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statistics for required reserves, the exchange rate, and the volatility in government borrowing 
from the SBP suggest that these regressors are not weakly exogenous.  
 
The single equation estimation strategy yields asymptotically consistent, though 
inefficient, estimates in the absence of weakly exogenous regressors. Hence the estimates are 
reliable for making inferences. We use the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) procedure to 
estimate the long-run relationship. The estimated parsimonious ARDL model is shown in the 
upper panel of Table A4 (in the Appendix). The specified model is subjected to a battery of 
diagnostic tests. The results from these tests, reported in the lower panel of Table A4, suggest 
that the specification is robust to the diagnostic tests and hence can be used for making 
Table 3. Testing for, and Estimation of Long-run Relationship for Interbank Liquidity  
 
F-Statistics 
 Long-run relationship 
  Coefficient p-values 
Excess liquidity 3.45**    
Required reserves 4.39***  -1.357 0.000 
Output gap 2.15  -0.366 0.000 
Discount rate 2.36  0.863 0.021 
Exchange rate 3.14*  -0.885 0.000 
Volatility of overnight rate 2.61  0.055 0.426 
Private credit 2.07  -0.799 0.000 
Index of Industrial Production  2.04  0.392 0.000 
Foreign currency deposits 1.48  5.796 0.003 
Volatility in government borrowing from 
SBP 
3.34**  -0.119 0.073 
Government borrowing from      
    SBP 2.88  0.657 0.002 
    Commercial banks  2.53  1.147 0.000 
    Non-banks 1.28  -0.374 0.005 
Intercept   16.269 0.133 
Critical values for I(1) Boundary¹ F-Statistics    
1% 3.86    
5% 3.24    
10% 2.94    
Notes: The second column shows the results of the bound test, as well as, the weak exogeneity test for the 
regressors. Pesaran et al. (2001) only provide critical values for 10 variables; the data period includes 289 
observations. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. The last two columns show the 
estimates of the long-run relationship between excess liquidity and the regressors and the relevant p-values. The 
long-run variance is estimated using Newey- West (1987). Dynamic estimates are obtained using Equation (9) 
and the long-run coefficients are calculated using Equation (10).  
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inferences.
26
 
Table A4 shows that some of the regressors explain the variation in excess liquidity with 
their long lags. These variables, such as government borrowing from the central bank and non-
bank institutions, are responsible for structural persistence in the interbank excess liquidity. 
Fuhrer (2009) argues that the persistence in an economic variable is structural if the factors 
explaining this variable also have persistence. This evidence suggests that government borrowing 
from the SBP and the non-banks reduce the effectiveness of the monetary policy in Pakistan.  
The long-run coefficients together with their p-values are shown in the last two columns 
of Table 3. These long-run coefficients are calculated using Equation (10) and the ARDL 
estimates reported in Table A4. Except for the volatility of the overnight rate and the volatility of 
government borrowing from the SBP, all long-run coefficients are significant at the five percent 
level. Volatility of government borrowing from the SBP is significant at the ten percent level. 
The insignificance of the volatility of the overnight rate is not surprising. Since 17
th
 August 
2009, the SBP has introduced an interest rate corridor to reduce the volatility in the overnight 
money market repo rate.
27
 This policy move has reduced the variation in the overnight rate.  
The signs of the long-run coefficients are in line with our expectations. The negative 
coefficient of required reserves indicates that increasing required reserves directly drain liquidity 
from the interbank market. The positive coefficient of the discount rate shows that the banks 
respond to the positive discount rate changes by increasing their excess liquidity holdings. 
However, the SBP frequently resorts to open market operations to mop up liquidity from the 
interbank market. The banks willingly substitute their cash liquidity for short-term government 
securities as the latter yield a lucrative risk-free return besides enhancing their ability to borrow 
from the SBP discount window, and thus reducing their liquidity risk.  
The coefficient of the exchange rate is negative suggesting that a depreciation of the 
                                                 
26
 The serial correlation is tested using the Breusch-Godfrey test with 12 lags and the Portmanteau (Q) test with 40 
lags. Both tests indicate that residuals are white noise. Normality of the residuals is tested using the Shapiro-Wilk 
test. The null hypothesis of normal residuals is rejected at the five percent level of significance. To check the 
severity of the problem, a non-parametric Kernel density estimation procedure is employed. Kernel density 
estimators, similar to histograms, approximate the density f(x) from observations on x. The data are divided into 
non-overlapping intervals, and counts are made of the number of data points within each interval. Figure A2, in the 
Appendix, shows that the deviation of Kernel density estimate from normal density estimate is minor and can be 
ignored without significant implication for inference. The stability of the specified model is tested using the 
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests, proposed by Brown et al. (1975). The graph shown in Figure A3, in the Appendix, 
indicates that the null hypothesis of stable specification cannot be rejected at the 95 percent level of confidence. 
27
 Vide DMMD Circular No.1 of 2009, State Bank of Pakistan. 
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Pakistan Rupee leads banks to decrease their liquidity holdings. Moreover, the coefficient of 
foreign currency deposits is positive and large in magnitude, which coefficient suggests that an 
increase in foreign currency deposits leads to an increase in excess liquidity holdings of banks. 
The large magnitude reflects the exchange rate of the Pakistan Rupee against the US Dollar.
28
 
Finally, a one percent increase in the foreign currency deposits causes a 5.8 percent increase in 
the excess liquidity in the interbank market.  
The estimates reported in Table 3 also show that government deficit financing by 
commercial banks and the SBP has positive long run effects on excess liquidity. The positive 
coefficient of the SBP credit to the government supports Ganley’s (2004) argument that the 
monetization of the government’s budget deficit is a main cause of excess liquidity in some 
countries. The negative coefficient with the non-bank institution borrowing shows that this 
source of financing has a negative long-run effect on excess liquidity, but its magnitude is 
small.
29
  
Next, we decompose excess liquidity into its voluntary and involuntary components, as 
indicated in Equation (11), using the long-run coefficients of Table 3. The outcome is shown in 
Figure 2. This figure indicates that the interbank market of Pakistan has experienced a structural 
shift since June 2008. Before June 2008, banks’ holdings of excess liquidity were largely 
‘involuntary’ representing lack of credit demand in the economy. Wyplosz (2005) argues that the 
central bank’s monetary tightening remains at risk if excess liquidity accumulation is demand 
driven. Any improvement in credit demand may cause a rapid increase in credit. Not 
surprisingly, the SBP consistently missed the inflation projections between 2005 and 2008.
30
  
After June 2008, excess liquidity holdings by banks become voluntary. The persistent 
foreign currency inflows and government deficit financing by the banking sector increased 
excess interbank liquidity. As Pakistan’s financial markets lack depth, banks preferred parking 
their liquidity in short-term government securities. Also, the SBP’s liquidity management after 
the fall of Lehmann Brothers contributed to the banking sector’s shift towards precautionary 
behavior. On 18
th
 October 2008, the SBP expanded the eligibility of long-term government 
bonds from five to ten percent. This move was meant to provide liquidity support to the 
                                                 
28
 Over the period of this study, the average of the Pakistan Rupee - US Dollar exchange rate was 72.97.   
29
 When government borrows from non-banks, excess liquidity with banks decreases as the deposits from banks get 
transferred to the non-bank institutions.  
30
 Inflation projections are inflation figures underlying the government budget plans. For a discussion on the 
deviation of actual from ‘projected’ inflation, see Omer and Saqib (2009). 
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Figure 2: Components of Interbank Excess Liquidity
interbank market and caused an increase in the borrowing ability of banks from the SBP discount 
window by roughly PKR135 billion, hence increasing 4- percent excess liquidity holdings of the 
banks in terms of their total time and demand liabilities.  
As discussed in Section 2, our involuntary liquidity estimates includes the output gap 
following Saxegaard (2006). We re-estimated the model with the output gap as a determinant of 
the involuntary liquidity accumulation, dropping the index of industrial production (IIP). Figure 
A4 in the Appendix shows that the overall conclusion of this paper remains unchanged. We 
prefer keeping IIP in our model mainly for statistical reason, as it helps in identifying the long-
run relationship between the regressors.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
We investigate excess liquidity in the interbank market of Pakistan using the bound test and 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag approach on weekly data for December 2005 to July 2011. Our 
findings suggest persistence of interbank excess liquidity. Our results also indicate that the 
financing of the government’s budget deficit by the central bank and non-banks contributes to 
persistence in interbank liquidity. This persistence may have weakening effect on the monetary 
transmission mechanism.  
Moreover, we identify a structural shift in the interbank market in June 2008. Before June 
2008, low credit demand was driving excess liquidity holdings by banks. After June 2008, 
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precautionary investments in risk free securities drive the liquidity holdings by banks. Perhaps, 
the change in the political regime in 2008 is related to this structural change. On June 11 2008, 
the government formed after the general election in February 2008, presented its first budget. 
Importantly, we did not have employed any break dummy in our model although the unit root 
tests have suggested structural breaks in the number of variables. As mentioned in Section 6.2, 
the shift dummy employed to incorporate the structural break turned out to be insignificant. 
Mohanty (2006) argues that such a structural shift in the banking sector’s behavior 
towards holding government securities may have repercussions on the economy, such as 
persistently higher interest rates, higher sovereign risk premium, and crowding out of private 
sector investments. Mishra et al. (2011) argue that the objective of deficit financing may become 
so important that it turns into a source of macroeconomic instability instead of stabilization. The 
independence of the central bank and its ability to conduct monetary policy effectively is then 
compromised.  
Given our findings, we suggest reducing the government budget deficit and to limit 
borrowing, especially from the central bank, in order to reduce liquidity inflow in the interbank 
market. We consider the recent legislative move aimed at limiting the government’s borrowing 
as a step in the right direction. On March 2012, State Bank of Pakistan Act (1956) has been 
amended restricting the government from borrowing from the SBP for more than one quarter 
(Clause 9C, p.13). However, further steps seem to be necessary, such as capping the 
government’s debt. Also, further liberalization of the foreign exchange market aimed at 
increasing the access of domestic banks to international financial markets could be helpful in 
enhancing banks’ foreign exchange management. A better ability of banks to manage their 
foreign exchange inflows may help the SBP to move from a managed float to a free floating 
exchange rate regime. All this could help in reducing the liquidity glut in the interbank market of 
Pakistan which is essential for increasing the efficacy of monetary policy.   
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Figure A4: Components of Interbank Excess Liquidity (Involuntary Output Gap)
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Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1 Overview of Monetary Developments in Pakistan between 2005-2011 (End of the year stock in billion Rupees) 
          FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 
Assets         
 Government Sector Borrowing (net)  
 
753  834  927  1509  2034  2441  3021  
        Net Budgetary Borrowing (i+ii) 
 
647  708  810  1365  1681  2011  2602  
                (i) From the State Bank of Pakistan 
 
268  404  345  1034  1165  1209  1201  
               (ii) From scheduled banks  
 
378  304  465  331  516  803  1401  
Credit to Non-Government Sector   
 
1782  2191  2576  3020  3190  3389  3547  
A. Net domestic assets of the banking system 2329  2718  3080  4022  4641  5232  5915  
         (i) State Bank of Pakistan  195  218  151  773  902  988  1037  
         (ii) Scheduled banks  2134  2501  2930  3248  3740  4244  4878  
B. Foreign assets of the banking system  
 
637  688  985  668  496  545  780  
         (i) State Bank of Pakistan  
  
195  565  788  480  303  379  614  
         (ii) Scheduled banks 
  
133  123  197  187  193  167  166  
Monetary Assets  (M2) (A+B)     2966  3407  4065  4689  5137  5777  6695  
Liabilities           
Currency in Circulation 
   
666  740  840  982  1152  1295  1501  
Bank Deposits with SBP (Reserves) 
   
196  208  305  425  274  290  349  
Time and Demand Deposits 
  
2117  2466  3011  3439  3700  4130  4809  
Foreign Currency Deposits 
    
180  196  207  263  280  345  375  
Money Supply (M2)        2966  3407  4065  4689  5137  5777  6695  
  
34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Description of Variables 
Name  Description 
Excess liquidity 
Reserves excess of statutory requirements (quantity of reserves deposited with the 
central banks + cash in their vaults +statutory liquidity requirement eligible 
securities) to the total time and demand liabilities.  
Required reserves 
Required reserves is combined effect of cash reserve requirement and statutory 
liquidity requirements over the period as shown in Table 1.  
Output Gap 
Output gap calculated using the Index of Industrial Production and the HP Filter, 
using λ=270400 as smoothening parameter. The output gap is measured as the gap 
between the trend and the actual level of output. 
Discount Rate SBP 3-day reverse repo rate    
Exchange Rate  Average weekly exchange rate of Pakistan Rupee per US Dollar  
Volatility in overnight 
rate  
Volatility of interbank overnight rate measured as ratio of 13 week moving average 
standard deviation and mean. 
Private Credit Private sector credit (as percentage of GDP) extended by the Banks 
Govt. borrowing- SBP Government borrowing (as percentage of GDP) from the central bank 
Govt. borrowing-banks  Government borrowing (as percentage of GDP) from the commercial banks 
Government borrowing 
from Non-Banks  Government borrowing (as percentage of GDP) from non-banking sector 
Index of Industrial 
Production 
Monthly Index of industrial production is disaggregated using 6-week forward 
moving average.  
Foreign currency deposits 
Residents’ foreign currency deposits (as percentage of GDP) deposited with the 
banks in Pakistan Rupee. 
Volatility in Govt. 
borrowing from SBP 
Volatility of government borrowing from the central bank measured as ratio of 13 
week moving average standard deviation and mean. 
MTBs 6-months Treasury Bills rate used as a proxy for the Discount Rate 
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Table A3. Unit Root Test Results 
 Dickey-Fuller Test  Philips-Perron Test 
 drift only drift with trend drift only drift with trend 
Excess liquidity 0.003 -1.924  0.174 -1.708 
Required reserves -1.635 -2.835  -1.58 -2.412 
Output gap -5.833* -5.822*  -2.968* -2.962 
Volatility in overnight rate -2.236 -2.46  -2.391 -2.481 
Volatility in SBP financing -3.272* -3.309  -3.185* -3.718* 
Credit to private sector  -1.729 -1.909  -1.718 -1.522 
Foreign currency deposits 0.279 -3.153  0.526 -2.901 
Government borrowings from:      
   Banks 1.622 -0.729  2.428 -0.042 
   SBP -1.586 -1.665  -1.12 -1.304 
   Non-banks 2.867 0.944  1.578 -0.924 
Exchange rate -0.846 -1.855  -0.442 -1.145 
95% Critical Values -2.879 -3.429  -2.878 -3.428 
Notes: The null hypothesis of ADF and PP tests assumes that the series has unit root. * indicates that the null 
hypothesis is rejected at 5% level of significance. 
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Table A4. Estimates of Short-run Determinants of Excess Interbank Liquidity 
  Level lag (1)  lag (2)  lag (3)  lag (4)  lag (4)  
Excess liquidity - 0.814***     
  (0.000)     
Required reserves -0.927*** 0.674     
 (0.000) (0.000)     
Output gap -0.019 -0.0003 -0.049*    
 (0.627) (0.995) (0.064)    
Discount rate 0.271* -0.130 0.184 -0.164   
 (0.060) (0.480) (0.315) (0.222)   
Exchange rate -0.278*** 0.113     
 (0.001) (0.162)     
Volatility in overnight rate 0.033 0.009 0.050 -0.08***   
 (0.168) (0.797) (0.139) (0.001)   
Credit to private sector -0.451*** 0.161 0.141*    
 (0.000) (0.108) (0.072)    
Government borrowing from:        
      SBP 0.235*** -0.066 -0.062 0.008 -0.080 0.087* 
 (0.000) (0.354) (0.301) (0.896) (0.208) (0.089) 
      Banks 0.407*** -0.193**     
 (0.000) (0.030)     
      Non-banks 0.037 0.063 -0.081* -0.038 0.052 -0.103*** 
 (0.367) (0.182) (0.053) (0.353) (0.238) (0.005) 
Index of Industrial Production -0.003 0.077*     
 (0.934) (0.066)     
Foreign currency deposits 1.080***      
 (0.003)      
Volatility in SBP financing -0.022*      
 (0.073)      
Intercept 3.030      
  (0.133)           
Diagnostic Test  Statistics p-values         
Adj. R-square 0.994      
F-Statistics 1182.59 (0.000)     
Normality  2.261 (0.012)     
Ramsey Reset Test  0.390 (0.760)     
Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance at1 -, 5-, and 10- percent level of significance.  p-values are reported 
in parenthesis. Normality test is based on Shapiro and Wilk (1965). The null hypothesis assumes that the variable 
is normally distributed. Ramsey Reset Tests is related to specification error. Ramsey test amounts to fitting higher 
power of residuals from regression of x on y. Terming the higher power of the residuals with t, the Ramsey Reset 
testing procedure tests t = 0 in specification y = xb + zt + u. The non-rejection of the null hypothesis t =0 
indicates the model specification do not have omitted variable. 
